Iran and the Hitler analogy
Mon. 06 Feb 2006
The
Washington Times
TODAY'S EDITORIAL
The symbolic resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency board
Saturday calling for Iran's referral to the United Nations Security Council is
just the latest evidence that the Islamist regime is on a collision course with
the United States and its allies.
A senior State Department official dealing with nuclear proliferation issues
suggested last week that Tehran may transfer a nuclear weapon to a third party.
Meanwhile, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, (signaling that she wants to move
away from the neo-appeasement policies toward Iran that were pursued by her
predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder) made explicit the analogy between the current
Iranian regime and the Third Reich.
Mrs. Merkel warned against a repetition of the complacency demonstrated by the
international community during the early years of Nazi rule. "Looking back
to German history in the early 1930s when National Socialism was on the rise,
there were many outside Germany who said, 'It's only rhetoric -- don't get
excited,' " she said on Saturday, referring to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statements
calling for Israel's destruction and questioning the Holocaust.
Mrs. Merkel added that the world cannot afford to demonstrate toward Iran the kind
of weakness shown toward Hitler prior to World War II.
But the fact is that the Western democracies' current approach toward Iran does not
match the German leader's rhetorical urgency. After protracted negotiations
with Russia and China, the United
States, Britain
and France agreed to a
compromise: that Iran
will not be referred to the Security Council for 30 days. This gives Moscow and Beijing, Iran's protectors, time to persuade Mr. Ahmadinejad and his boss, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, to cooperate (or at least pretend to).
Thus far, Tehran
has responded with a mixture of threats and conciliatory-sounding pablum. In the past 48 hours, Iranian officials have
denounced U.S. leaders as
"terrorists"; threatened to bar oil tankers from the Persian Gulf; vowed to bar the IAEA from visiting Iranian
nuclear facilities; and declared their intention to go forward with uranium
enrichment. Iranian representatives have both rejected outright and said they
were willing to negotiate over Moscow's
suggestion to shift Iranian uranium enrichment activities to Russia.
As Iran thumbs its nose at
the international community, it is important to keep several facts in mind: 1)
Time is on Iran's
side. Every day that goes by without a resolution is another day that Tehran has to continue to develop an indigenous capability
to produce nuclear weapons and perfect the missiles capable of delivering them
to targets in Europe, Israel
and elsewhere. 2) While a democratic revolution to overthrow the Iranian regime
would be welcome, it is difficult to see how this will be accomplished given
that the regime possesses virtually all the guns inside the country. Still,
it's also well past time for the United States government to provide
pro-democracy forces inside and outside the country with serious technical and
logistical assistance to bring their message to the Iranian people. 3) As Iraq illustrated,
sanctions are of limited use in influencing the behavior of rogue regimes bent
on flouting the will of the international community. There is ample reason to
doubt the willingness of European governments to pursue a sustained policy of
sanctions in the face of economic pressure and threats from Iran.
But as Robert Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, pointed out
last week, the stakes are too high to allow for the possibility of failure.
"Iran
is at the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism," Mr. Joseph
said. "If Iran
has fissile material or nuclear weapons, the likelihood of their transfer to a
third party would increase -- by design or through diversion."
In short, a nuclear-armed Iran
is certain to make the world a much more violent, dangerous place for Americans
and a more comfortable place for jihadists.