The New York
Sun
By DANIEL PIPES
As
the Iranian regime barrels
forward, openly calling for the destruction of Israel and overtly breaking the
nuclear non-proliferation rules, two distinctly undesirable prospects
confront the West.
The first is to acquiesce to Tehran
and hope for the best. Perhaps deterrence will work and the six-decade
moratorium on using atomic weapons will remain in place. Perhaps the Iranian
leadership will shed its messianic outlook. Perhaps no other states will
repeat Iran's
decision to flaunt the rules they had promised to obey.
The key words in this scenario are "hope" and "perhaps,"
with the proverbial wing and prayer replacing strategic plans. This is not,
to put it mildly, the usual way great powers conduct business.
The second prospect consists of the American government (and perhaps some
allies) destroying key Iranian installations, thereby delaying or terminating
Tehran's
nuclear aspirations. Military analysts posit that American airpower, combined
with good intelligence and specialized ordinance, suffice to do the needed
damage in a matter of days; plus, it could secure the Straits of Hormuz.
But an attack will have unfavorable consequences, and especially in two
related areas: Muslim public opinion and the oil market. All indications
suggest that air strikes would cause the now alienated Iranian population to
rally to its government. Globally, air strikes would inflame already hostile
Muslim attitudes toward America,
leading to a surge in support for radical Islam and a further separation of
civilizations. News reports indicate that Tehran
is funding terrorist groups so that they can assault American embassies,
military bases, and economic interests, step up attacks in Iraq, and launch rockets against Israel.
Even if Western military forces can handle these challenges, air raids may
cause Iranians and their supporters to withhold oil and gas from the market,
engage in terror against energy infrastructure, and foment civil unrest, all
of which could create an economic downturn rivaling the energy-induced
recession of the mid-1970s.
Faced with these two unappealing alternatives, I conclude, along with Senator
McCain, a Republican of Arizona, that "there's only one thing worse than
the United States
exercising a military option. That is a nuclear-armed Iran."
But is there a third, more palatable option? Finding it is the goal of every
analyst who addresses the topic, including this one. That third option
necessarily involves a mechanism to dissuade the Iranian regime from
developing and militarizing its atomic capabilities. Does such a deterrence exist?
Yes, and it even has a chance of success. Iran, fortunately, is not an
absolute dictatorship where a single person makes all key decisions, but an
oligarchy with multiple power centers and with debate on many issues. The
political leadership itself is divided, with important elements dubious about
the wisdom of proceeding with nukes, fearful of the international isolation
that will follow, not to speak of air strikes. Other influential sectors of
society - religious, military, and economic in particular - also worry about
the headlong rush.
A campaign by Iranians to avoid confrontation could well prevail, as Iran does not
itself face an atomic threat. Going nuclear remains a voluntary decision, one
Tehran can
refrain from making. Arguably, Iranian security would benefit by staying
non-nuclear.
Forces opposed to nuclearization need to be
motivated and unified, and that is made more likely by strong external
pressure. Were Europeans, Russians, Chinese, Middle Easterners, and others to
act in sync with Washington, it would help
mobilize opposition elements in Iran. Indeed, those states have
their own reasons to dread both a nuclear Tehran
and the bad precedent it sets for other potential atomic powers, such as Brazil and South Africa.
That international cooperation, however, is not materializing, as can be seen
at the United Nations. The Security Council meanders on the Iran issue and
an Iranian official has been elected to, of all things, the U.N. disarmament
commission (which is tasked with achieving nuclear disarmament).
Deterring Tehran
requires sustained, consistent external pressure on the Iranian political
body. That implies, ironically, that those most adverse to American-led air
strikes must (1) stand tight with Washington
and (2) convince Iranians of the terrible repercussions for them of defying
the international consensus.
Such steps offer no guarantee of success, but they do present the only
realistic way to prevent grave dangers.
Mr. Pipes (www.DanielPipes.org) is
director of the Middle East Forum and author of "Miniatures"
(Transaction Publishers).
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